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ABSTRACT 
 
A novel on-line diagnosis method is proposed in this 
paper that uses a qualitative dynamic model of the system 
and its colored Petri nets model. The model contains both 
the normal and the possible faulty operational modes of 
the system. The deviation between the normal and faulty 
modes is characterized based on P-HAZID tables. The 
actual system state can be searched on the occurrence 
graph constructed in advance. Starting from this node the 
possible consequences and root causes can be determined 
on-line with traversing on the graph. The proposed 
method is illustrated on simple case studies.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Large complex technological systems, such as 
manufacturing or process plants, are often characterized 
by a large event flow with discrete or qualitative valued 
variables in case of any abnormal operation. Therefore, 
qualitative model-based diagnosis has a large practical 
importance, but possesses unique theoretical challenges in 
the form of computational complexity at the same time.  
 
Building the qualitative model is the most important step 
of the diagnosis. A method is proposed for automatic 
transformation of a quantitative model into its qualitative 
form in (Yan 2003). Another key task in prediction-based 
diagnosis is the prediction problem. Zhu and Tan (2010) 
proposed the notion of ternary qualitative function to 
solve effectively the qualitative prediction problem. In 
another approach of qualitative diagnosis, Console et al. 
(2007) proposed a framework for decentralized model-
based diagnosis of complex systems modeled with 
qualitative constraints. In their methods local diagnosers 
are assigned to the subsystems and they are supervised by 
the diagnoser of the complex system. 
 
Qualitative models used for diagnosis are given in 
different forms (e.g. graphs, discrete event models, 
qualitative difference equations), and originate not only 
from special purpose modeling, but also from risk and 
hazard analysis (HAZID). Earlier work has shown that the 
result of HAZID analysis given in the form of HAZID 
tables can be effectively used for diagnosis both in the 
static and dynamic cases (Németh and Cameron 2013), 
(Tóth et al. 2014).  
 
Colored Petri nets (abbreviated as CP-nets) combine the 
modeling advantages of Petri nets and compactness of the 
functional programming language Standard ML (Jensen et 
al. 2007). The CP-nets clearly enable both the 
mathematical and the graph representation of a 
technological system to be modeled, where the signals of 
the system have discrete range space and time is also 
discrete (Fanti and Seatzu 2008). It means that CP-nets 
can be used to model systems characterized by signals 
with qualitative range space and controlled by operating 
procedures containing events.  
 
The aim of this work is to develop a hybrid method for 
on-line diagnosis that combines the availability and 
flexibility of HAZID information-based diagnosis with the 
computational power and tools available for CP-nets.  
 
BASIC CONCEPTS 
 
In the following section the most important concepts are 
summarized on characterizing measured values in 
qualitative way, on hazard analysis of technological 
systems using P-HAZID method, and on timed CP-nets 
and their occurrence graph based analysis. 
 
Qualitative Range Spaces 
 
Measured values of a technological system do not 
necessary be equal to a given prescribed value, but it is 
often enough if they belong to a specified range. For 
example, for an arbitrary sensor the following ranges can 
be defined: 
Qs = {e
-, 0, L, N, H, e+} 
where 0, L, N, H refer to zero, low, normal and high 
measured value, respectively, while e- and e+ may refer to 
outlier value caused by a bias failure of the sensor. The 
state of an actuator can be described similarly. 
 
Events, Traces and Deviations 
 
The actions to be performed by the operators and the 
changes in the measured values are summarized in an 
event list usually called operational procedures. In this 
paper it is assumed, that the elements of this list are 
arranged by the time, i.e. they contain the value of input 
and output variables in a given time stamp , as  
event = (, input values, output values). 
 
The set of consecutive events is called trace. Based on the 
faultless or faulty operational course, nominal and faulty 
traces can be distinguished. The nominal trace gives the 
list of events under fault free conditions while faulty 
traces describe the events if a given fault occurs. At the 
recent stage of our work it is assumed that only one fault 
takes place in a modeled technological unit, and this fault 
is constantly present since the beginning of the operation. 
Comparing the trace of a given operational course (called 
characteristic trace) and the nominal trace deviations 
can be defined if a fault occurs. The most important 
deviation types are the following:  
 never-happened - if the given combination of input 
and output variable values does not occur in the 
characteristic trace at any time stamp; 
 later or earlier - if the given combination occurs but at 
a later or earlier time stamp than in the nominal trace; 
 greater or smaller var_outi – if the qualitative value of 
an output variable is greater or smaller in the 
characteristic trace than in the nominal trace at a given 
time instant . 
 
Procedure HAZID 
 
HAZOP or FMEA analysis is normally used for hazard 
identification of a technological system. As a combination 
and extension of these two methods the procedure 
HAZID (abbreviated as P-HAZID) is introduced in (Tóth 
et al. 2014). The result of a P-HAZID analysis is a table 
containing the possible deviations in the system together 
with their implication and causes. A cause can be a root 
cause if it is a non-measurable failure mode of a system 
element. 
 
The diagnostic procedure based on these P-HAZID tables 
is as follows. As a first step the deviations between the 
characteristic trace and nominal trace is determined. Then 
the causes of the determined deviations can be deduced 
going backwards on the rows on the P_HAZID table until 
a root cause is found (Tóth et al. 2014). This means that 
the P-HAZID tables are processed in the backward 
direction of the cause-consequence relations to perform 
diagnosis.  
 
Colored Petri Nets 
 
According to the formal definition (see details in (Jensen 
1997)) a CP-net model consists of places, transition, guard 
and arc functions, colors and tokens. For diagnostic 
investigations the following special choices were used in 
modeling of technological systems. 
 
 Places refer either to the input and output variables 
and the color of tokens on them describe the 
variables’ value, or they serve as fault and deviation 
places and their tokens refer to type of the fault 
occurring in the system and to the emergent deviation 
from the nominal trace. 
 The main task of transitions is the timing of the 
operation. It is assumed that the operation of the 
system can be divided into user defined time period, 
and the values of variables change at the end of a 
period. The guard functions assigned to the 
transitions contain the fault generation function 
(Gerzson et al. 2012). 
 Arcs connect places to transitions according to the 
logical connections between them, and the arc 
functions describe the change of colors. 
 
The consequences of a processing step can be stochastic in 
a technological system. For example, the step may be 
completed in a normal way, or a fault occurs. The 
probabilistic nature of a transition t associated to a 
processing step can be modeled in a CP-net in such a way, 
that a fault function is built into its guard function. This 
fault function returns the logical value true or false with 
predefined probability, and the token values of the 
adjacent consequence places of transition t can be 
controlled by this logical value. This type of transition 
firing is called stochastically fired transition (Leitold et 
al. 2013). 
 
Having the model of the investigated system the 
behavioral analysis can be done with the occurrence graph 
(Jensen 1997). The basic idea of the occurrence graph is to 
generate all of the reachable markings (system states) 
from the initial one in a form of a graph. Investigating the 
branches of the graph the cause and the consequences of 
given system state can be considered. 
 
THE PETRI NET BASED DIAGNOSIS METHOD 
 
The aim of this section is to introduce the proposed CP-
net model-based diagnosis. 
 
The Qualitative Model and Data Used for Diagnosis 
 
For the general description of the proposed method let us 
assume that the P-HAZID table of the modeled system 
is given and this table is complete and consistent. This 
is, however, rarely the case of large complex dynamic 
systems; the handling of the partial information case is the 
subject of further work.  
 
As it was mentioned before, an operational step of the 
system is described as an event, while the consecutive 
events form a trace. The nominal trace is a trace that 
corresponds to the fault-less operation of the system. 
During a real operational course a characteristic trace is 
observed which contains the actual measured list of 
events. Therefore the characteristic trace can contain fault-
related or fault-free events. Comparing the nominal and 
the characteristic traces the list of deviations can also be 
obtained. 
The CP-net Diagnoser 
 
In order to use a CP-net for diagnosis we construct a 
special CP-net model. The input and output variables are 
modeled as places in this net (see Fig. 1.). The color sets 
belonging to these places contain the possible values of 
the variables. One of the other places describes the fault 
occurring during the operation, while a special place refers 
to the deviations from the normal course. At the end of the 
simulation this place contains all the deviations as tokens 
generated in the course of the system operation in case of 
a given fault. 
 
 
Figures 1: Generalized CP-net Model for Diagnosis 
 
Two transitions are defined in this CP-net model. The first 
one (t1 in Fig. 1.) is for setting the initialization values to 
places. For the initialization of the input and output 
variables the arc expression functions belonging to the 
arcs connecting transition t1 and the corresponding places 
contain the initial value of these variables. Transition t2 
generates the changes taking place as time evolves. This 
way the above CP-net is regarded as a discrete event 
model of the system to be diagnosed.  
 
The Course of the On-line Diagnosis 
 
The proposed diagnosis method is based on the 
investigation of the occurrence graph of the CP-net model 
of the diagnosed system. The occurrence graph is 
generated for a given initial state of the system. Assume 
only those faults can occur during the operation of the 
system which are built in the fault function and all the 
consequence of these faults are known. It is also assumed 
that the consequences of faults appear in the token color 
of variables and deviation places in CP-net model. In this 
case the occurrence graph contains all the reachable 
markings (states) of the net. Therefore both the states of 
normal operation (i.e. the nominal trace) and the states of 
different faulty modes are encoded into the nodes on the 
graph.  
 
Having the CP-net model of the system to be diagnosed, 
the occurrence graph can be constructed off-line in 
advance. This graph is used during the operation of the 
on-line diagnosis in such a way, that the operator 
determines the node referring to the actual system state, 
and starting from this node the possible consequences can 
be concluded. On the other hand, the possible causes of 
faults can be determined from this node of the graph, too. 
Assume that the complete characteristic trace is known 
from the operation of the technological system and a 
deviation list is generated by comparing that to the 
nominal trace. Then the fault can be determined by 
comparing the resulted deviations with the token colors of 
the deviation place in the terminal nodes of the occurrence 
graph. 
 
We can also consider the case, when the complete 
characteristic trace is not known because the operation of 
the system is not completed but the deviations up to a 
certain time instant are known. In this case the recent 
deviation list has to be compared to the color of 
deviation place having the same time stamp in the 
nodes of occurrence graph. If only one node has equality 
in its deviation list, then the possible faulty mode is 
determined. If more than one node meets this criterion, i.e. 
different operational modes result in the same deviations, 
then the possible set of faults can only be determined and 
further investigations are needed. 
 
SIMPLE CASE STUDIES 
 
Two simple case studies are presented: the first one is a 
simple system consisting of just a single component, 
while the other one is a composite system built up from 
three components.  
 
Filling Process of a Tank 
 
For the illustration of described hazard identification 
method the filling process of a tank is investigated. This 
simple technological unit consists of a tank with an input 
and output connection (see Fig. 2.). The control of the 
liquid flow is performed by magnetic valves. There is a 
level sensor in the tank to check the actual value of the 
level. 
 
Figures 2: Scheme of Simple Tank Example 
 
The operating procedure for the tank is as follow. In the 
initial state the valves are closed, the tank is empty. As a 
first step the input valve is opened. Then the control 
system waits for the filling up of tank for two time 
periods. Then the output valve is opened and the tank 
works as a continuous unit. The actual value of the level 
sensor is recorded in every time period but these data are 
used for monitoring the correct operation of the unit only. 
 
It is assumed that the following faults can occur in the 
system: 
 The fault of the level sensor, what can be either 
negative or positive bias error, i.e. the measured 
value is less or greater than the actual value with one 
qualitative unit. 
 The fault of the tank, when the tank is leaked and the 
level of the liquid remains zero. 
It is assumed only one of these faults can occur and the 
fault had evolved before the process starts and it remains 
constant during the operation. 
 
The input variables of this system are the states of the 
input and output valves, while the output variable is the 
level value measured by the level sensor. The qualitative 
range spaces for the variables are as follows. For the input 
variables, i.e. for the valves the qualitative range space 
Qv = {op, cl} 
is used, where op and cl refers to the open and close state 
of valves, respectively. For the output variable (for the 
measured level value) the already introduced qualitative 
range space Qs is applied (see Sec. Basic Concepts).  
 
An element of the event list has the following structure: 
event = (, state of input valve, state of output valve, 
measured value of level sensor), where  is the time 
stamp. The trace for the normal operational course is as 
follows: 
T = event0, event1, event2, event3; 
where 
event0 = (0, cl, cl, 0) – initialization; 
event1 = (1, op, cl, 0) – the input valve opens; 
event2 = (2, op, cl, L) – an intermediate state; 
event3 = (3, op, op, N) – the filling up is ready. 
 
This event list is modified if a fault occurs. If the tank 
leaks, the following trace is generated: 
T' = (0, cl, cl, 0), (1, op, cl, 0), (2, op, cl, 0), (3, op, op, 0) 
As a consequence of the leak the tank remains empty. In 
case of negative bias error of level sensor: 
T“ = (0, cl, cl, e-),(1, op, cl, e-),(2, op, cl, 0),(3, op, op, L). 
The value shown by the sensor is less with one qualitative 
value than in the normal trace. 
 
Comparing these traces to the nominal trace, the 
deviations from the normal operational mode can be 
determined and the P-HAZID table can be set up. A part 
of this table is shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Part of P-HAZID Table of Tank Filling Example 
 
Cause Deviation Implication 
Tank_leak NH(2, op, cl, L) NH(3, op, op, N) 
Tank_leak SML(2, op, cl, L) SML(3, op, op, N) 
Neg_bias LAT(1, op, cl, 0) LAT(2, op, cl, L) 
LAT(1,op, cl, 0) LAT(2, op, cl, L) NH(3, op, op, N) 
 
The software package CPNTools (CPNTools) was used 
for implementing the proposed hazard identification 
method, and for the generation and investigation of 
occurrence graph. The CP-net model of the simple tank 
can be seen in Fig 3. The places ‘in_valve’ and 
‘out_valve’ refer to the input variables while the place 
‘level_sens’ to the output variable. The color sets 
belonging to these places correspond to the defined 
qualitative range spaces. In case of fault, the token on 
place ‘fault’ contains its type and the tokens on place 
‘dev’ give the deviations from the normal course. 
Transition ‘t1’ initializes the system. The fault 
initialization function in the guard function of transition 
‘t1’ determines the type of the fault.  
 
Figures 3: The CP-net Model of the Simple Tank System 
 
Transition ‘t2’ models the operation of the system. This 
transition fires as many times as many events are in the 
event list. As result of a firing the following can happen in 
the system: 
 state of input and output valves can change; 
 the measured value of the level sensor can change 
according to faultless or faulty operational mode; 
 in case of fault the generated tokens on place ‘dev’ 
describe the deviations from the normal course based 
on P-HAZID table. 
 
Figures 4: The Occurrence Graph of Simple Tank 
Example 
 
The occurrence graph of the simple tank example can be 
seen in Fig 4. In this case the graph is a tree which has 
four branches according to four operational modes 
(normal and three different faults) of the system. In case 
of normal operational mode the work of the system ends 
properly (Node 15). There is no token on place ‘dev’, i.e. 
the system works in a normal, faultless way. In this simple 
example the complete deviation lists in every operational 
case are different, therefore comparing the resulted 
deviation list with terminal nodes the fault can be 
identified unambiguously. In case of on-line fault 
identification it can be stated if there is any deviation at 
the first time instance then based on its character the 
negative bias or positive bias can be determined. If the 
deviation appears at the second time instant only, then the 
fault must be a leak.  
 
Series of Three Tanks 
 
The developed method gives possibility to diagnose 
complex composite systems, too. Exploiting the 
hierarchical modeling feature of CPNTools, a CP-net 
model of complex system can be constructed form the 
known CP-net model of simple technological units.  
 
Figures 5: The Hierarchical CP-net Model of the Serial 
Tank System 
 
To show this, the example of three tanks in serial is 
investigated. The upper level of the CP-net model can be 
seen in Fig. 5. The upper level contains the logical 
connections among the elements which are necessary for 
the right timing and the fault propagation. The models of 
the tanks, which are embedded as subnets, are very similar 
to the model in Fig. 3, some modification of arc 
expressions and an extra place for fault propagation are 
needed only. For the hazard investigations it is assumed 
that fault can occur at any of the system element but only 
one fault can occur at an element. The occurrence graph of 
whole system can be used for fault detection as it was 
described at the single tank example.  
 
Although the serial tank system is relatively simple 
system but its occurrence graph contains more than 200 
nodes. Searching on a large graph is a computationally 
hard problem. In (Tóth et al, 2014) is proved that complex 
system can be structurally decomposed and the diagnosis 
can be performed on the component elements separately. 
This can be used in our case so that the occurrence graph 
of the subsystems is applied for the diagnosis first, then 
the search can be spread out to the other parts or to the 
whole occurrence graph, if necessary. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
A novel on-line diagnosis method is introduced for hazard 
identification of technological systems. The method is a 
hybrid procedure for on-line diagnosis that combines the 
availability and flexibility of HAZID information-based 
diagnosis with the computational power and tools 
available for CP-nets. The deviations between the nominal 
and characteristic traces stem from the technological 
system can be identified on the occurrence graph of CP-
net model. The occurrence graph of the system to be 
diagnosed can be constructed in advance and with the on-
line searching on the graph the possible fault can be 
determined. The proposed methods and tools were 
illustrated using two simple case studies. 
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